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BOOK REVIEW
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME. By
William H. Rehnquist. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998. Pp.
254. $26.
REVIEWED BY MICHAEL B. BRENNAN*
Inter Arma Silent Leges
"In time of war, the laws are silent"
"The Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it."
U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9, Clause 2.
This Roman dictum, and this constitutional clause, capture the clash
between the demands of a government's successful war effort and the
compelling need to protect civil liberties. That conflict is the subject of
the most recent historical monograph by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist. This book describes numerous examples of governmental
use of authority which infringe civil liberties during declared wars in
American history. It also yields flashes of insight into the views of our
country's Chief Justice, including his commentary on Supreme Court
precedent in this interesting area of the law.
In All the Laws But One,2 Rehnquist describes scenes during
wartime in which the United States government's activities interfered
with the civil liberties of individual citizens who were often opposed to
the war. Along with historical explication, Rehnquist briefs the legal
cases these clashes produced, critiques the principles underlying those
# Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
* Staff Counsel, Wisconsin Criminal Penalties Study Committee. B.A. University of Notre
Dame 1986; J.D. Northwestern University 1989. The author thanks Stewart Simonson, who
had the idea for this review, as well as David W. Simon for his helpful comments and
suggestions.
1. Other books by Chief Justice Rehnquist include GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC
IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992);
and THE SUPREME COURT How IT WAS, How IT Is (1987).
2. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
(1998).
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decisions, and relates the personalities of the individuals involved.
Rehnquist uses these examples to support the book's thesis: while inter
arma silent leges may have described this tension in the past, over time
the phrase rings less true in the least justified wartime curtailments of
civil liberty.
I. WARTIME CIVIL LIBERTIES
A. Civil War
Rehnquist spends 13 chapters-nearly three-quarters of the
book--on the tension between civil liberties and the Union's efforts to
fight the Civil War. The bookends of this discussion are a chapter
describing Abraham Lincoln's travel to Washington for his inauguration
during the troubled months before the Civil War, 3 and chapters
detailing President Lincoln's assassination and the trial of John Wilkes
Booth's accomplices.4 Between these events, Rehnquist recounts the
major collisions between the federal government fighting a civil war and
the power of the great writ of habeas corpus.
1. Suspension of the Writ and Subsequent Cases
In layers of historical detail, including descriptions of the lives and
families of the major figures, Rehnquist puts into context President
Lincoln's suspensions of habeas corpus. A plot to assassinate Lincoln in
Baltimore had been unearthed and forced the President-elect to alter his
route into the nation's capital for his first inauguration In April 1861,
Lincoln had been President for less than one month when the South
took up arms against the Union by firing upon Fort Sumter in South
Carolina.6 Federal troops were sent to the key railroad junction of
Baltimore on the way to defend Washington. There, sixteen people
were killed during anti-Union riots.' With the approval of Maryland's
governor, railroad bridges into Baltimore had been burned to prevent
more federal troops from entering the city.8 Telegraph lines into
Washington had been cut, and Lincoln worried about a naval blockade
of the Chesapeake Bay. Fearful that the Maryland state legislature
3. See generally id. at 3-11.
4. See id. at 155-69.
5. See id. at 6.
6. See id. at 13-15.
7. See id. at 18-21.
8. See id. at 22.
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would arm that state against the Union, Lincoln consulted with his
attorney general about suspending the great writ.9 He convened his
cabinet to glean their views; observers described him as tense."0 Given
the violence, and possible insurrection of a state so close to the capital,
he suspended the writ:
The Commanding General of the Army of the United States:
You are engaged in suppressing an insurrection against the laws
of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any
military line which is now or which shall be used between the city
of Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance
which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
for the public safety, you personally, or through the officer in
command at the point where resistance occurs, are authorized to
suspend the writ.
The order's explicit reason for the suspension and its geographic
specificity disclose that Lincoln understood the magnitude of this step,
and show his desire to circumscribe its use.
Nearly a month after Lincoln's order, John Merryman was arrested
for participation in the destruction of the railroad bridges after the
Baltimore riots. Merryman's counsel petitioned Chief Justice of the
United States Roger B. Taney2 for a writ of habeas corpus. 3 Taney
issued the writ, and made it returnable the following morning. When
the court marshal told Taney that the military had blocked attempts to
serve the writ, Taney issued a written opinion calling upon Lincoln "'to
enforce the process of this Court. '" 4 This precipitated a constitutional
crisis: two coequal branches of government, at odds over one branch's
power to suspend the Constitution.
Rehnquist questions Taney's reasoning in the Merryman opinion.
Taney concluded first that because the Founders placed the Suspension
Clause in Article I and not Article II of the Constitution, only Congress
9. See id. at 22-23.
10. See id. at 22.
11. Id. at 25.
12. Rehnquist portrays his predecessor in the center chair of the Supreme Court as
irascible, and includes a discussion of the history behind and reasoning of Taney's majority
opinion in the infamous Dred Scott decision. See id. at 26-32.
13. See id. at 26.
14. Id. at 36 (quoting BALTIMORE AMERICAN, May 29,1861).
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may suspend the writ.'5 This conclusion would rule out any express or
implied authority the President might have under his war powers in
Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Taney also concluded that only
a soldier could be detained in prison or brought to trial before a military
commission. 6 Rehnquist finds more strength in this argument. Taney
considered whether the President could suspend the writ himself, or
whether it required the approval of Congress. 7 To Taney, civilian
Merryman could be detained, charged, and tried only pursuant to an
order of the federal courts as long as they were open and functioning. 8
Extraordinarily, the Lincoln administration made no direct response
to Taney's opinion. (Imagine the outcry today if a President ignored a
Supreme Court order.) But in a July 4, 1861 speech to a special session
of Congress, Lincoln noted that the Constitution was silent as to which
branch of government might exercise the authority to suspend the writ.
He asserted that in an emergency, when Congress was not in session, the
President had that authority.9
Merryman was freed on bail but was never brought to trial on an
indictment for conspiracy to commit treason. Taney insisted that
Merryman (and others) not be tried in his absence, yet Taney refused to
participate in the trials in his role as the sitting circuit justice.' Each
branch looked the other way, averting a constitutional crisis.
2. Suspension of the Writ is Expanded
The original, well-circumscribed suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus lasted for just over one year. When in 1862 Edwin M. Stanton
became Secretary of War, Lincoln issued "Executive Order No. 1,
Relating to Political Prisoners," in which he justified suspending the writ
of habeas corpus based on the unprecedented nature of the Civil War,
the treason prevalent in 1862, and the early military losses suffered by
Union troops. Six months later Stanton issued an order "by direction of
the President" suspending the writ nationwide for "persons arrested for
15. See id. at 36-37.
16. See id. at 37-38.
17. Later in the Lincoln administration, Congress expressly authorized the President to
suspend the writ under certain circumstances. See id. at 37.
18. See id. at 37.
19. See id. at 38.
20. This was ironic: a keystone of Taney's written opinion was that because the federal
courts were open and functioning, anyone who violated the law could be indicted and tried
there, rather than before a military tribunal. See id. at 39.
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disloyal practices."'2 Rehnquist contrasts the number and kind of cases
resulting from suspension of the writ during its previous administration
by Secretary of State William H. Seward-less than 900 civilians were
arrested in the field during insurrectionary operations, none of whom
were tried before military tribunals--with the administration of the
suspension by Secretary Stanton, where about 13,000 civilians were
detained, most without charges, and convicted in and sentenced by
military courts.'
This nationwide suspension of the writ was tested in Wisconsin.
Nicholas Kemp, a leader of a riot against the Civil War draft in Port
Washington, Wisconsin, was arrested and imprisoned at Camp Randall
in Madison, Wisconsin. Kemp's lawyer obtained a writ of habeas corpus
from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, but when presented with the
writ, the military jailer responded that President Lincoln had suspended
the writ nationwide.' The Wisconsin high court was presented with the
same question Chief Justice Taney faced in Merryman. The justices
decided that the President did not have the authority by himself to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and that martial law could not
control in areas of the country where there was no insurrection or
combat. 4 Nonetheless, "'out of respect to the national authorities,'" the
court refused to arrest Kemp's military custodian.'
Another test of this nationwide suspension took place in Ohio. In
the spring of 1863, Clement Vallandigham, a civilian and a lawyer,
hoped to receive the Democratic nomination for Ohio governor. When
party leaders rejected him, he decided to get himself arrested and ride a
favorable tide of public opinion into office. Vallandigham publicly
criticized the Union's war effort, including its practice of trying civilians
before military commissions.26 General Ambrose Burnside, in charge of
the Union army in Ohio, had issued General Order Number 38, which
provided "'[t]he habit of declaring sympathies with the enemy will no
longer be tolerated in this department. Persons committing such
offenses will be at once arrested with a view to being tried as above
21. Id. at 59-60 (quoting 4 ROBERT N. SCOTT, THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A
COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES,
Series II, 358-59 (Gettysburg, National Historical Society, 1971-72)).
22. See id. at 49.
23. See id. at 61-62.
24. See id. at 24.
25. 1d. at 63 (quoting In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 359 (1863)).
26. See id. at 65.
1999]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
stated or sent beyond our lines and into the lines of their friends.' ,2
Burnside sent observers to Vallandigham's speeches, including one
which ended with a plea to citizens who valued their rights to exercise
their franchise and "'hurl King Lincoln from his throne."' Burnside
had Vallandigham arrested and tried in a summary manner before a
military tribunal in Cincinnati. Two days after the military commission's
verdict and sentence, Vallandigham's attorney sought a writ in federal
court, arguing that habeas corpus had not been suspended in Ohio. The
judge ruled for the government.
Public opinion, shared by members of Lincoln's cabinet, was that
Burnside had acted precipitously. Doubt existed as to whether
Vallandigham had counseled resistance to the laws, and his statements
had arguably contravened only Burnside's order, not any federal
statutes.29  Lincoln commuted Vallandigham's sentence from
imprisonment for the duration of the war to banishment beyond the
Union lines into the Confederacy.'
Although the executive branch prevailed in In re Kemp and Ex Parte
Vallandigham, it did so as a result of pragmatic political judgments,
rather than the strength of its positions. The expansion of Lincoln's
original suspension order resulted in weaker cases for the government.
The necessarily compelling case for a nationwide suspension of civil
rights had not been made.
3. Ex parte Milligan
Rehnquist also describes the treason trials during the summer of
1864 in Indianapolis of some "copperheads "-Northerners sympathetic
to the South who had been disloyal to the Union--out of which arose
the famous Supreme Court case Ex parte Milligan. The government
charged the defendants with conspiracy against the United States,
including planning for an armed uprising to seize Union munitions,
planning to free Confederate prisoners of war in Illinois, and even to
abduct the Republican governor of Indiana.
Rehnquist synopsizes the events of the trials in detail, at points
27. Id. at 64 (quoting SCOTT, supra note 21, at series I).
28. See id. at 65-66.
29. The Supreme Court held that it had no jurisdiction to review the decision of the
military commission. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243,251 (1863).
30. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 67.
31. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
32. Of interest is when Rehnquist explains the federal conspiracy statutes of that day
and teaches how that area of law has evolved since. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 86-88.
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reprinting pages of testimony to demonstrate the strengths and
weaknesses of the government's cases against different defendants.3
The military commission found the defendants guilty and sentenced
them to life in prison at hard labor. They filed habeas corpus petitions.
Rehnquist spends a chapter relating the backgrounds of the
Supreme Court justices at the time Milligan was argued and decided.'
He spends another chapter discussing the highlights of the six
consecutive days of oral arguments of the case, including critiques of the
reasoning and styles of the various advocates,35 and analyzing the
Court's decision rejecting the government's contention that the Bill of
Rights was suspended during war or rebellion and directing that the
writs of habeas corpus be issued because the military commission had no
jurisdiction to try and sentence the defendants.'
Although the Court's ruling was made up of two opinions, they were
in accord on the fundamental issues of the case. Suspension of the writ
under Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution permitted the government
to detain suspected persons, but not to try them outside of the normal
judicial process so long as civil courts were open. Accordingly, the
Constitution required that Milligan be tried before a court composed of
judges holding office for life, not a military commission.37 In an Act of
Congress of March 3, 1863, suspects were allowed to be detained only
until a grand jury had met in the district in which they were held; if they
were not indicted by the time the grand jury adjourned, they were
discharged from custody. To the Court, this law meant that a prisoner
in Milligan's position must either be indicted and tried in the civil courts,
or discharged from custody.
Under this view, there was no occasion for the justices to consider
what might have been the result if Congress had provided for civilian
Milligan to be tried before a military commission.3M But the Court in
Milligan went further. The concurring justices explained why they
thought Congress did not have the power to authorize such a trial, a
question that did not come before the Court until two years later in Ex
parte McCardle.39
33. See id. at 91-100.
34. See id. at 105-17.
35. See id. at 118-27.
36. See id. at 128-37.
37. See id. at 128-31.
38. See id. at 131.
39. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
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Rehnquist concludes that the Court in Milligan ignored the sound
advice of many of its own opinions that it should declare an Act of
Congress unconstitutional only if there was no other ground for deciding
the case.' This is especially true since the Court was working under the
recent cloud of its decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,41 in which it had
stretched to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional on doubtful
grounds. Rehnquist justly compliments the Milligan decision for its
rejection of the government's position that the Bill of Rights has no
application in wartime. But he also correctly emphasizes how much
more widely approved the decision would have been over time if the
Court had not gone out of its way to declare that Congress had no
authority to do what Congress never tried to do: enact a law authorizing
trials of civilians by-military commissions during wartime.42
B. World War I
In June 1917, Congress enacted the Espionage Act, which proscribed
traditional spying but also contained two statutes that affected civil
liberties: false reports or statements made with the intent to interfere
with the operation or success of the U.S. military were punishable by
imprisonment and a fine; and every letter or other writing advocating or
urging treason or insurrection to any U.S. law could not be mailed, and
the author could be imprisoned and fined.43
Charles Schenck was convicted of violating the Espionage Act by
printing and distributing leaflets to draftees that urged draft resistance.
Schenck argued that his conviction violated the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of the press. In a unanimous opinion by Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme Court upheld Schenck's
conviction reasoning that once the leaflet was found to have been
intended to obstruct armed forces recruiting, its words created "a clear
and present danger" of bringing about conduct Congress could try to
prevent.' Rehnquist agrees with the conviction and affirmance,
reasoning that draft evasion was conduct Congress had a right to
prevent, and Schenck had distributed the pamphlets to draftees, leaving
no doubt as to his intent.45
40. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 134-36.
41. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
42. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 137
43. See id. at 173.
44. Id. at 174.
45. See id.
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How was Justice Holmes's "clear and present danger" test applied in
later cases? In 1917, U.S. Postmaster General Albert Burleson
employed the provision of the Espionage Act banning any writing
"'containing any matter advocating or urging treason.' " 6 This provision
denied use of the mail to The Masses, a magazine which contained four
cartoons and four pieces of text which the postmaster deemed anti-war
and violative of the Espionage Act. The publishers sought an injunction
upholding their right to mail their publication, and the case was heard
by then-U.S. District Judge Learned Hand. Rehnquist quotes liberally
from Judge Hand's decision in favor of the publisher, in which he
distinguished between strongly worded unpatriotic criticism of the draft
and actual advocacy of unlawful resistance to it.47 Four months later, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed Judge
Hand's decision, concluding that because the cartoons might interfere
with enlistment in the military, they violated the Espionage Act.'
Rehnquist agrees with Judge Hand's distinction: "Advocacy which
persuades citizens that a law is unjust is not the same as advocacy that
preaches disobedience to it. But if freedom of speech is to be
meaningful, strong criticism of government policy must be permitted
even in wartime. ,
4
Rehnquist also discusses other cases brought to the Supreme Court
under the Espionage Act, and President Woodrow Wilson's desire to
suppress criticism of America's war effort in World War I. To achieve
this end, the Wilson administration relied more on federal statutes than
executive fiat, while courts of the day gave only small relief to civil
libertarians. Rehnquist notes that the judiciary's review of such claims
was an advance in the cause of civil libertarians.' Although the
government never suspended the writ of habeas corpus during World
War I, more than 2,000 people were prosecuted under the Espionage
Act during the war and shortly thereafter, with few more than 1,000
convicted."' Litigation under the Act exemplified the tension Rehnquist
explores in this book. Although the executive branch had prevailed
again, courts were balancing civil liberties with the war effort.
46. Id. at 173 (quoting Espionage Act, Title XII, § 2, 65 Stat. 230 (1917)).
47. See id. at 178.
48. See id. at 177-78.
49. Id. at 178.
50. See id. at 178-82.
51. See id. at 183.
1999]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
C. World War II
An account of the controversial wartime internments of Japanese-
Americans is given in two chapters. 2 Rehnquist gives context to the
government's actions and its claim of military necessity, by describing in
detail the war in the Pacific and its impact on the West Coast of the
United States. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, President
Franklin Roosevelt appointed a special commission to ascertain and
report on the threat of further Japanese attacks on the United States.
That commission discovered Japanese espionage in Hawaii. At that
time, one hundred thousand "Issei" (first generation Japanese
immigrants) and "Nisei" (children of the Issei born in the U.S.) resided
on the American West Coast. In February 1942, in response to this
report, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order Number 9066,
imposing a curfew on ethnic Japanese, requiring them to report to
relocation centers, and then moving them to camps located in the
interior of California and the mountain states. Rehnquist quotes from
the memoirs and correspondence of the men who decided upon these
forced evacuations. Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote how
"'Japanese raids on the West Coast seemed not only possible but
probable in the first months of the war."'53 Attorney General Francis
Biddle speculated on President Roosevelt's feelings about the
internments: "'Nor do I think that the Constitutional difficulty plagued
him. The Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President.
That was a question of law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must
decide. And meanwhile-probably a long meanwhile-we must get on
with the war.'"
The internments resulted in constitutional litigation. Rehnquist
discusses the Supreme Court cases of Hirabayashi v. United States,55
Korematsu v. United Statesm and Ex parte Endo, all involving Nisei
Japanese-Americans. Each contended that Executive Order Number
9066 was unconstitutional because it presumed that the entire racial
group was disloyal, rather than securing individual determinations of
disloyalty.5 Because of procedural variations, the three cases each
52. See id. at 184-202, 203-211.
53. Id. at 190.
54. Id. at 191-92 (quoting FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORrrY 219 (1962)).
55. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
56. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
57. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
58. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 195.
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reached the Supreme Court at different times.
In Hirabayashi, decided in June 1943, Chief Justice Harlan Stone
greatly narrowed the scope of the case by deciding that because
Hirabayashi had been convicted of and received concurrent sentences
for violating a curfew and not reporting to the relocation center, the
Court only needed to rule on the validity of the curfew requirement,
which it upheld, relying on the "military necessity" argument of a threat
by the Japanese navy to the Pacific coast immediately after the bombing
of Pearl Harbor.59 On the charge that distinctions based on race alone
were constitutionally impermissible, Rehnquist lets another of his
predecessors, Chief Justice Stone, defend the Court's opinion: "'The fact
alone that the attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather than
another enemy power sets these citizens apart from others who have no
particular associations with Japan. '"6
Korematsu did not come to the Supreme Court for oral argument
until October 1944. 61 In that case, the Court had to confront the
relocation requirement as well as the curfew. The Court upheld the
relocation requirement based on the military necessity reasoning in the
Hirabayashi decision. Again, Rehnquist lets the authoring justice,
Justice Hugo Black, defend the opinion: "'To cast this case into outlines
of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which
were presented, merely confuses the issue. "'
In Endo, decided at the same time as Korematsu, an interned
Japanese-American woman submitted to an evacuation order, but
claimed that she was a loyal American citizen against whom no charge
had been made, and therefore that she was entitled to a writ of habeas
corpus.' The government agreed that Endo was loyal, and had not
charged her with any offense. Under these circumstances, the Court
decided that she must be released from confinement.6'
Rehnquist devotes a chapter to postwar criticism of the Court's
decisions on the internments. He finds some of the criticism justified
and some not. The military necessity distinctions the government
offered might have been legally adequate in time of war and under the
Alien Law of 1798 to support a difference in treatment between the Issei
59. See id. at 198-99.
60. Id. at 200 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100-01).
61. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
62. REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 200 (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24).
63. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
64. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 201.
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and the Nisei.5 But the military's submissions showed no particular
factual inquiry into the likelihood of espionage or sabotage by the Nisei,
but rather showed only generalized conclusions that they were
"different" from other Americans.' Under present law, this would not
justify dislodging the Nisei, who were American citizens, from their
homes on the basis of ancestry and treating them differently than other
American citizens.67
Rehnquist comments on the disingenuity in the sequence of the
three opinions: "There was no reason to think that Gordon Hirabayashi
and Fred Korematsu were any less loyal to the United States than was
Mitsuye Endo."' The United States' military position was much more
favorable in the fall of 1944 than in the spring of 1942.69 Rehnquist links
the outcomes in these cases to the United States' fortunes in the war: as
they improved, the Supreme Court came around to the view that a
Japanese-American could be entitled to release upon a finding of
loyalty."
II. A TREND AGAINST CURTAILMENTS OF CIVIL LIBERTY DURING
WARTIME?
In All The Laws But One, Rehnquist relates governmental
imposition on individual liberties to the country's strength and stability:
the greater the threat a war posed to domestic order, the greater
deference exists to the executive's suspension of civil liberties. In the
Civil War, the existence of our country was at stake. Because the threat
was internal-the combatants dying on both sides were Americans, and
all fighting took place on American soil-infringements on civil liberties
were numerous. But during World War I, the United States was more
mature as a nation, and there was no direct attack on American soil.
The United States had a large immigrant population some of whom
were perceived to have uncertain loyalties. Curtailments of civil
liberties still existed, but at times the courts intervened. During World
War II, given a direct and brutal attack on American soil, the military
necessity argument enjoyed some, but not unlimited, traction.
65. See id. at 209-11.
66. See id. at 209.
67. See id. at 206.
68. Id. at 202.
69. See id.
70. Rehnquist also includes an interesting chapter on Hawaii under martial law during
World War II. See id. at 212-17.
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Upon this premise, Rehnquist constructs his thesis that the
government's authority to engage in conduct that infringes civil liberty is
greatest in time of a declared war, but that this authority is ameliorating.
There are marked differences among the government's activities
during the Civil War, World War I, and World War II. While President
Lincoln relied purely on presidential authority or the orders of military
commanders to suspend the writ of habeas corpus during the Civil War,
during World War I Postmaster General Albert Burleson at least acted
under a provision of the Espionage Act. And although President
Roosevelt acted unilaterally to authorize the internment of west coast
Japanese during World War II, Congress ratified his order immediately.
From this trend, Rehnquist concludes that the President may do many
things in carrying out a congressional directive that he may not be able
to do on his own, as well as that Congress may not always grant the
President all of the authority for which he asks, such as President
Wilson's request for censorship during World War L"n
Since the Civil War, those claiming infringement of their civil rights
also have increasingly resorted to the courts. This is partly due to the
limited jurisdiction of federal courts in the 1860's. "Not until 1875 did
Congress grant lower federal courts authority to hear cases where the
plaintiff based his lawsuit on a violation of the federal Constitution."'
Although such a pre-1875 plaintiff would not have been precluded from
filing his claim in state court, this would not necessarily have resulted in
vindication.'
Rehnquist also finds the federal government's attempts to suppress
public criticism of the government's war effort growing weaker over
time. Such efforts were heavy-handed in the Civil War. Although
Postmaster Burleson's endeavors were largely successful during World
War I, the federal courts at least reviewed them. And by the time of
World War II, the government did not even attempt to squelch any
public criticism of war policy.74
While Rehnquist casts doubt on the prescriptive truth of inter arma
silent leges, he finds in the maxim a descriptive truth: courts are naturally
reluctant to decide a case against the government on an issue of national
71. See id. at 219.
72. Id. at 220.
73. For example, in Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859), the Supreme Court
of the United States strongly overruled the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in its attempt to free
a prisoner held in the custody of a federal marshal. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 220.
74. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 221.
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security during a war. While judicial reluctance to hinder a war effort
might result in judges abstaining from unnecessary constitutional
interpretation, it hurts individuals actually deprived of their civil
liberties. In a wonderful passage in the book, Rehnquist inquires into
the nature of civil liberty itself.' The word "civil" takes its root from the
Latin term civis, meaning citizen. Rehnquist considers a citizen not
someone free from governmental restraint, but a person who owes
allegiance to an organized government. "In any civilized society the
most important task is achieving a proper balance between freedom and
order.,76 In wartime, this balance shifts toward order, in favor of the
government's ability to confront conditions that threaten the nation.
For that reason, Rehnquist believes that President Lincoln was correct
to avoid "all the laws but one"-the writ of habeas corpus-being
enforced.?
As declared wars become less common, will the trend Rehnquist
describes against curtailments of civil liberty continue? Suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus is the primary indicator of martial rule, an
often misunderstood concept. As Justice Field pointed out in Ex parte
Milligan: "'strictly there is no such thing as martial law.... Let us call
the thing by its right name; it is not martial law, but martial rule.' ""
Today, the President retains authority to mobilize the national guard. A
state governor also can request that the President call up federal troops.
In doing so, the governor in effect has turned over part of that state to
federal rule. Although the rationale often given for this transfer is the
"unity of command" of law enforcement authorities, martial rule is in
effect, and authorities may infringe citizens' civil rights.
Martial rule is not just a legal antiquity. Consider the federal and
state governmental responses to the riots and looting in Los Angeles
after the acquittals in state court of police officers charged with beating
Rodney King. An instance of international terrorism, such as the
bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City, also could
precipitate martial rule. Whether the direction Rehnquist discerns will
continue cannot be predicted, but in the circumstances listed,
Rehnquist's premise may hold true: as the threat to domestic order
increases, so will deference to the executive's suspension of civil
liberties.
75. See id. at 221.
76. IL at 222.
77. See id. at 223.
78. 71 U.S. at 58.
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III. FINDING THE CHIEF JUSTICE BETWEEN THE LINES
All The Laws But One is well worth the read. Rehnquist defends his
thesis skillfully and thoroughly. Many readers will find interesting how
a sitting Supreme Court chief justice interprets seminal cases authored
by his predecessors. Readers of more technical legal works may find
Rehnquist's writing too easily within the reach of lay readers, but he sets
this as a goal to include non-lawyers in his audience. 9 All readers will
find his writing clear and succinct; he brings historical scenes alive.
Treatment of and emphasis on a subject can tell the reader much
about an author. Finding an author between the lines is especially
interesting when he is the most powerful judge in the United States.
Glimpses can be had of Chief Justice Rehnquist's legal philosophy and
views through his telling of history and in his explanation of cases.
At times, Rehnquist the lawyer comes through. In his discussion of
the Indianapolis treason trials which led up to Ex parte Milligan, he
emphasizes how the government must have the proper jurisdictional and
statutory basis for action.' He reviews the exact allegations in the
indictment as well as the trial testimony, witness-by-witness. He details
the connections, or lack thereof, between incriminating facts and each
individual defendant.8'
Throughout the book, however, Rehnquist the judge is ever-present.
His interest in and mastery of separation of powers issues can be seen in
his description of Chief Justice Taney's rebuke of President Lincoln in
the Merryman case.' Why Rehnquist avoids discussing the political
question doctrine,3 which is arguably implicated by the interplay of the
politics of war and the justiciability of civil liberties suits, is not clear.
Rehnquist's critique of the World War II internment cases illustrates
his view of the legal process in the tension between a government at war
and an individual's civil liberties: "Judicial inquiry, with its restrictive
rules of evidence, orientation towards resolution of factual disputes in
individual cases, and long delays, is ill-suited to determine an issue such
as 'military necessity.'"" Of interest is his use of the oral argument
transcripts from Ex parte Milligan to critique the quality of advocacy in
that case; modern-day advocates can learn from these pages what not to
79. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at xiii.
80. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 85-88.
81. See id. at 91-100.
82. See id. at 32-39.
83. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,209 (1962).
84. See REHNQUIST, supra note 2, at 205.
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do in a Supreme Court argument before the author.8
Rehnquist delves into the background of the justices deciding these
cases. Does the Chief Justice's legal philosophy include a touch of legal
realism? Perhaps, such as when he links the outcome in Supreme
Court's decisions in the World War II internment cases to the United
States' war fortunes. 6
Most importantly, between the lines one finds a judge attuned to the
hardship of an individual litigant attempting to protect his civil liberties,
who is at the same time cognizant of the government's role in keeping
order during wartime." Rehnquist's ability to see both sides of this
tension is the sign of a great judge. A compliment made of Judge
Learned Hand could apply to Chief Justice Rehnquist:
The values he served were at once higher and more subtle:
impartiality, intellectual detachment, respect for the higher
authority of sometimes murky Supreme Court guides, an
awareness of the limited authority in which courts must operate
to justify their untouchable independence, and the belief that
reason must lead to result, not vice versa.'
85. See id. at 118-27.
86. See id. at 202.
87. See id. at 222-23.
88. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 598 (1994)
(quoting THE ART AND CRAFT OF JUDGING: THE DESICIONS OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND
298 (Hershel Shanks, ed., 1968)).
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